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Abstract
The main argument of this paper is that migration does not necessarily
reduce informal risk sharing in the village. We model migration as a kind
of storage technology with uncertain payments for a household. Theoreti-
cal conditions, under which the “technology” can improve risk sharing in a
dynamic limited commitment framework, are provided. Our empirical find-
ings also show positive impacts of migration on risk sharing, in particular,
when children migrate for education opportunities. The data are from the
Townsend Thai Annual Surveys (1999-2010). The impacts of migration on
income and on consumption smoothing are jointly estimated in a simulta-
neously determined system.
Key Words: Migration, Informal Risk Sharing, Consumption Smoothing, Income,
Risk Aversion.
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1 Executive Summary
In this paper, we discussed the impact of migration on household consumption
smoothing from a theoretical perspective and an empirical perspective. Our the-
oretical and empirical results indicate that migration does not necessarily reduce
informal risk sharing in the village. Using the Townsend Thai Annual Surveys
(1999-2010), the impacts of migration on income and on consumption smoothing
are jointly estimated in a simultaneously determined system.
We found that the overall impact of migration on household consumption
smoothing is positive. Households are better insured in the within-village risk-
sharing networks when one or more than one household member has migrated.
At the same time, household per-capita income is increased by US$1961 due to
migration. Our estimation results also suggest that who migrates for what pur-
pose matters when measuring the impacts of migration. Household head migration
and child migration for jobs contribute to a higher increase in per-capita income,
but have little impact on consumption smoothing. In particular, households with
children migrating for education are better insured compared to the others.
Our theoretical model considers migration as a cash-in-advance contract be-
tween the sending household and the migrant (Bulow and Rogo↵, 1989). It can
also be regarded as a kind of storage technology (as in Ligon et al., 2000), but
with uncertain payments. In a dynamic limited commitment framework, we found
that the impact of migration on risk sharing depends on the type of risk-sharing
contract. If voluntary payments can be enforced before the realisation of the states
in implementing the informal contract, in addition to ex post transfers, migration
can improve risk sharing.
This is because, on the one hand, ex ante payments increase the amount of the
support that the migrant receives, and then, increase the expected remittances.
On the other hand, ex ante payments improve the level of commitment in the
village and thus improve the e ciency of risk sharing as suggested by Gauthier et
al. (1997).
In the empirical part, our strategy is to directly estimate the impacts of mi-
gration on household income and on consumption smoothing in a simultaneously
determined system. Identification is a challenging task. Our endogenous variables
are income, consumption growth and migration. We use land property rights as
predetermined factors of income. It is suggested in the literature that secured land
rights encourage invest- ment in land fertility and lead to substantially higher out-
put (Goldstein and Udry, 2008). To our knowledge, there is no direct evidence
in the literature that land rights are correlated with consumption growth. Nev-
ertheless, De la Rupelle et al. (2009) found that land-right insecurity leads rural
workers in China to migrate less, or for shorter periods. However, even where
there exists a causal correlation between land rights and the choice of migration,
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we can still view land rights as a predetermined predictor of income, as long as the
causal relationship is through the channel of an income e↵ect. As it has been well
explained in De la Rupelle et al. (2009), land-right insecurity increases migration
costs that is the income loss caused by the loss of land. In other words, land rights
only a↵ect migration decisions through their impacts on incomes.
It is more tricky to construct the instrument for migration decisions. We can-
not use the proxy of the migrants networks as an instrument, since risk-sharing
networks are endogenous in our system. Instead, we consider the group of in-
dividual labourers that are similar in age to the migrants in the village in each
cross section. Some of those labourers in the group are migrants, while others
are not. We use the proportion of those labourers to the village population as a
predetermined factor of migration. The reasons are as follows:
Given the land areas and the population size of the village, an increase in the
number of labourers that are similar in human capital is likely to cause a decrease
in the marginal labour productivity in the village. Migration is a way to improve
labour resource allocation. We assume that labourers at the same age in the village
are similar in the level of human capital. Then, any individual at the age of the
migrants is more likely to migrate if the number of similar labourers is greater,
given the size of the population. In practice, for each individual observed in the
data, we picked the year when he or she reached the age of the migrants. The
number of labourers at the same age at that year divided by the population size
is considered as the value of the migration predictor for the individual. If the year
is not covered in the survey, we filled the value of the predictor with the same
ratio at the earliest year that we can observe. For those who had not reached the
age, we used the same ratio at the contemporaneous year when the individual is
observed. In this way, we constructed an instrument variable for migration, which
has household-level variations across years, thanks to the relative long duration of
the Townsend Thai survey.
As another important part of our empirical results, we recovered risk-aversion
parameters following the approach developed in Dubois (2001). We use the esti-
mated parameters to test the correlation between risk aversion and the migration
decision, assuming that more risk-averse households are less likely to send away
migrants if migration has a negative impact on consumption insurance. Our results
show that, except from child migration for education, the other types of migration
are not significantly correlated with risk aversion. The level of risk aversion is
positively and significantly correlated with child migrating for education. These
results indicate that child migration for education improves the level of insurance
for the related households, whereas head migration and child migration for jobs
are more likely to be motivated by higher incomes rather than by risk aversion.
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2 Introduction
Labour migration in developing countries can be motivated by income gaps be-
tween the origins and the destinations, or can also be initiated by an e↵ort to
loosen constraints associated with a variety of market failures, such as the absence
of a formal insurance market. It is more reasonable to consider an agent that mi-
grated following a calculation of the benefits and costs from both aspects. In this
paper, we jointly evaluate the impacts of migration on income and on consumption
smoothing in a simultaneously determined system.
Many studies suggest that migration contributes to the income growth at the
origins. As for the role of migration in risk reduction, the literature tends to have
di↵erent opinions.
Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) found that female migration for the purpose of
marriage is a way for rural Indian households to extend risk-sharing networks in
order to mitigate income risks and facilitate consumption smoothing. Remittances
sent back in response to negative shocks at the origins are direct evidence that
migrants share risks with their families (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Yang and Choi,
2007).
However, some recent studies suggest that migration may not be an e↵ective
risk-reduction strategy since it can crowd out informal risk sharing in a village.
Informal risk sharing has been identified as an important instrument for con-
sumption smoothing in villages in many developing countries (e.g. Dubois, 2001;
Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Kinnan and Townsend, 2012; Kochelakota, 1996; Ligon
et al., 2002; Townsend, 1994; Udry, 1994). Using the ICRISAT panel (2001-2004),
Morten (2013) found that temporary migration reduces risk sharing in villages in
India and, vice versa, that informal risk sharing discourages migration. The util-
ity gain from migration is found to be lower, contrasting endogenous to exogenous
risk sharing. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) suggest that the low rate of male mi-
gration in rural India could be explained by the existence of informal risk-sharing
networks and missing insurance markets. Migrants risk losing insurance from the
networks. If the utility reduction due to losing insurance cannot be compensated
by the income gain from migration, the labourer will not migrate.
The literature mentioned above indicates that the particular types of migration
are relevant with regard to risk sharing. For example, why is female migration for
the purpose of marriage likely to extend risk-sharing networks while male migra-
tion is not? And, how about the other types of migration, such as migration for
education?
We suggest the case in which the intra-household insurance contract between a
migrant and his or her household can be nested inside the informal risk-sharing con-
tract. From the household’s aspect, the decision about migration is less restricted
by one’s own financial status since one is supported by the village network. From
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the village’s aspect, migration benefits are redistributed through risk sharing. The
aggregated risks in the village are reduced and every household in the network can
benefit from an increase in aggregated resources and a decrease in consumption
volatility. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that migration reduces risk sharing.
The last question that we raise about the previous studies is the following: Is
the model of migration in the Indian society with a strict caste system represen-
tative of other developing counties? In this paper, we try to explore the above
questions from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
Our theoretical model considers migration as a cash-in-advance contract be-
tween the sending household and the migrant (Bulow and Rogo↵, 1989). It can
also be regarded as a kind of storage technology (as in Ligon et al., 2000), but
with uncertain payments. In a dynamic limited commitment framework, we found
that the impact of migration on risk sharing depends on the type of risk-sharing
contract. If voluntary payments can be enforced before the realisation of the states
in implementing the informal contract, in addition to ex post transfers, migration
can improve risk sharing.
In fact, a study by Bold and Dercon (2009) distinguished two types of risk-
sharing contracts among insurance groups in villages in Ethiopia, in the sense that
whether or not group savings are accumulated based on premiums paid ex-ante, in
addition to the payments made after the realisation of the state. They found that
groups with ex-ante payments are better o↵ in consumption smoothing. Bold and
Dercon (2009) provides evidence that ex ante payments is not just a theoretical
concept but can be enforced in the real world. In the theory, Gauthier et al. (1997)
showed that the enforcement of ex ante payments relaxes the ex post incentive
constraint and improves the level of commitment in risk sharing.
The main argument of our theoretical analysis is that migration can improve
risk sharing even in an economy with limited levels of commitment, provided that
ex ante payments can be enforced. This is because, on the one hand, ex ante
payments increase the amount of the support that the migrant receives, and then,
increase the expected remittances. On the other hand, ex ante payments improve
the level of commitment in the village and thus improve the e ciency of risk
sharing as suggested by Gauthier et al. (1997).
In the empirical part, our strategy is to directly estimate the impacts of mi-
gration on household income and on consumption smoothing in a simultaneously
determined system. Using the panel data from the Townsend Thai Annual Sur-
veys (1997-2010),1 we found that the overall impact of migration on household
consumption smoothing is positive. Households are better insured in the within-
village risk-sharing networks when one or more than one household member has
migrated. At the same time, household per-capita income is increased by US$
1See Townsend (2013) for an introduction of the survey.
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1961 due to migration.2
Our estimation results also suggest that who migrates for what purpose matters
when measuring the impacts of migration. Household head migration and child
migration for jobs contribute to a higher increase in per-capita income, but have
little impact on consumption smoothing. In particular, households with children
migrating for education are better insured compared to the others. The possible
explanation related to our theoretical findings is as follows:
Our theoretical results show that the impact of migration on risk sharing de-
pends on the implementation of ex ante transfers. In fact, ex ante payments are
more likely to be enforceable if a small amount of ex ante transfers by one agent
can support a large surplus that the agent can obtain from the payment. On the
contrary, a high ex ante payment increases the incentive of the other agent who re-
ceives the payment ex ante to break the contract and run away with the payment.3
If the villagers believe that education is a kind of investment with a high rate of
return, they will be willing to contribute a small amount of money to the child
who is going to a university in the city. These ex ante payments from the village
increase the total expected values that would be sent back by the child, and at the
same time relax ex post self-enforcing constraints in implementing the risk-sharing
contract. This could explain why we found a higher level of risk sharing for child
migrating for education.
As another important part of our empirical results, we recovered risk-aversion
parameters following the approach developed in Dubois (2001). The idea is to
derive the consumption growth equation from a full risk-sharing model, assum-
ing CRRA utilities with heterogenous risk preferences that depend on household
characteristics. We use the estimated parameters to test the correlation between
risk aversion and the migration decision, assuming that more risk-averse house-
holds are less likely to send away migrants if migration has a negative impact on
consumption insurance. Our results show that, except from child migration for
education, the other types of migration are not significantly correlated with risk
aversion. The level of risk aversion is positively and significantly correlated with
child migrating for education. These results indicate that child migration for ed-
ucation improves the level of insurance for the related households, whereas head
2We consider migrants that were or are adult household members observed in the data and are
absent from the village in each cross section. Household members defined in the Townsend Thai
survey are individuals living in the household for at least six months out of the twelve months
in the survey year and children who are studying away and are supported by members of this
household. Thus, migration cases in our study include both those who migrate permanently and
temporarily. In fact, in our data we observe that temporary migrants may become permanent
migrants. Conversely, some migrants, having been away for a couple of years, may return to their
households. We will present the details about the definition and construction of the migration
indicators in Section 5.2 and in Appendix A.3.
3See discussions in Gauthier et al. (1997).
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migration and child migration for jobs are more likely to be motivated by higher
incomes rather than by risk aversion.
Our empirical model is a system of simultaneously determined equations. Iden-
tification is a challenging task. Our endogenous variables are income, consumption
growth and migration. We use land property rights as predetermined factors of
income. It is suggested in the literature that secured land rights encourage invest-
ment in land fertility and lead to substantially higher output (Goldstein and Udry,
2008). To our knowledge, there is no direct evidence in the literature that land
rights are correlated with consumption growth. Nevertheless, De la Rupelle et al.
(2009) found that land-right insecurity leads rural workers in China to migrate
less, or for shorter periods. However, even where there exists a causal correlation
between land rights and the choice of migration, we can still view land rights as
a predetermined predictor of income, as long as the causal relationship is through
the channel of an income e↵ect. As it has been well explained in De la Rupelle
et al. (2009), land-right insecurity increases migration costs that is the income
loss caused by the loss of land. In other words, land rights only a↵ect migration
decisions through their impacts on incomes.
It is more tricky to construct the instrument for migration decisions. We can-
not use the proxy of the migrants’ networks as an instrument, since risk-sharing
networks are endogenous in our system. Instead, we consider the group of in-
dividual labourers that are similar in age to the migrants in the village in each
cross section. Some of those labourers in the group are migrants, while others
are not. We use the proportion of those labourers to the village population as a
predetermined factor of migration. The reasons are as follows:
Given the land areas and the population size of the village, an increase in the
number of labourers that are similar in human capital is likely to cause a decrease
in the marginal labour productivity in the village. Migration is a way to improve
labour resource allocation. We assume that labourers at the same age in the village
are similar in the level of human capital. Then, any individual at the age of the
migrants is more likely to migrate if the number of similar labourers is greater,
given the size of the population.
In practice, for each individual observed in the data, we picked the year when
he or she reached the age of the migrants. The number of labourers at the same
age at that year divided by the population size is considered as the value of the
migration predictor for the individual. If the year is not covered in the survey, we
filled the value of the predictor with the same ratio at the earliest year that we can
observe. For those who had not reached the age, we used the same ratio at the
contemporaneous year when the individual is observed. In this way, we constructed
an instrument variable for migration, which has household-level variations across
years, thanks to the relative long duration of the Townsend Thai survey.
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Hansen-Sargan overi-dentification statistics 4 and C statistics 5 failed to reject
the validity of our instruments. The LM test of redundancy of specified instruments
rejects the null hypothesis and indicates that our instruments are not redundant
(Baum et al., 2007).
The parameters are estimated through Three-stage Least Square regression
method. We test the rank conditions of identification. The rank condition is
satisfied for each equation in the system, and thus, the system is identified (Baum
et al., 2007; Greene, 2002).
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the theoretical illustra-
tion; Section 3 presents the construction of our empirical model and identification
strategies; data are presented in Section 4; estimated results are discussed in Sec-
tion 5; and, finally, we close this paper with our conclusion in Section 6. Tables,
graphs and supporting paragraphs are listed in the Appendix.
3 A theoretical illustration
3.1 The setup
Consider two households in a village: i and j with a single good6 in each time
period t 2 {1, 2, ...}. For each period, there is a positive finite set S = {1, ..., S} of
states of nature. Card{S} = N . Formally, uncertainty is captured by a Markov
process with the probability of transition from state s to state r given by ⇡sr. we
assume that ⇡sr > 0 for all s and r. In each period, household i and j receive
respectively an income yis and y
j
s of this single good. There is no formal insurance
market. But i and j can ensure each other through an informal mutual insurance
contract. The informal contract is self binding. In case of default, the household
that fails to make the promised transfer will be excluded from all future insurance
possibilities. We assume that the village is small and the households take the
world interest rate ⇢ as given.
Households have twice continuously di↵erentiable Bernoulli utility consumption
functions u(c), where c   0 is the consumption, with u0(c) > 0, u00(c) < 0 for all
c > 0. Households live infinitely and discount the future with a common factor  .
The precise timing of the realisation of various events within period t, is as
follows:
• t0: At the beginning of period t, the migration decision is made, along with
a specification of the intra-household migration contract.
4See Hayashi (2000), page 227-8, 407 and 417.
5See Hayashi (2000), page 218-22 and page 232-34.
6It can be simply considered as money.
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• t1: The state of nature is realised.
• t2: At the end of period t, remittances, voluntary transfers and consumption
take place.
The migration contract in our model is short term, specifying how resources
are shared between the migrant and the household within the period only.7
3.1.1 Migration and the support-remittance contract
We model the implicit contract between the migrant and the sending household
as a cash-in-advance contract (Bulow and Rogo↵, 1989). It can also be regarded
as a kind of storage technology (Ligon et al., 2000). The household that decides
to invest in migration at date t0 receives remittances at date t2. However, we are
di↵erent from Ligon et al. (2000) in that the payments (remittances) generated
from the technology are uncertain depending on the realisation of the states.
At date t0, household i decides to ask one of the household members to mi-
grate.8 The household provides some support P i in terms of a single good to the
migrant. Then, ex post, the migrant pays the agreed remittance Ris back according
to the realised state s.
As in Bulow and Rogo↵ (1989), the argument of whether or not the migrant
accepts the arrangement is based on an arbitrage condition, and we do not need to
place any restrictions on the utility of the migrant. Moreover, we assume that the
migrant has full commitment to pay back the agreed remittances. The arrangement
is accepted as long as the household support o↵ers at least the expected market
value of the remittance:
(1 + ⇢)P i(t0) = E[Ris(t2)], (1)
where E[Ris(t2)] =
PS
r=1 ⇡srR
i
s(t2), and R
i
s(t2)   0.9
7Alternatively, we could think of long-term contracts with renegotiations. If there is no costs
for renegotiations, we will have the same results.
8Migration can involve multiple migrants in a single household. However, for the purpose
of simplicity, we consider only one migrant in one household. Obviously, we view migration
as a collective household decision, instead of an individual decision. One may consider that
migrants leave the village on their own independent will. We model migration as a household
decision based on two important aspects of the findings in the literature. Firstly, migration is
a movement significantly a↵ected by household financial constraints (e.g. Halliday, 2006; Bryan
et al., 2014). Secondly, the costs and benefits of migration are shared between the migrants and
non-migrants within the household following intertemporal contractual arrangements other than
altruism (Stark, 1991).
9The non-negativity means that there is no state of nature in which the household would
accept a negative remittance. One must also have P i(t0)   0, but this holds whenever (1) and
the non-negativity of remittances hold.
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Note that if the interest rate is higher, the support-remittance strategy becomes
more attractive for household i, because a small amount of support can sustain a
large amount of expected remittance.
3.1.2 Autarky values
In autarky, household i is excluded from any mutual insurance opportunities and
has total resources:
zis(t) = R
i
s(t2) + y
i
s(t),
We assume that household income is comprised of a deterministic part and a
stochastic part and yis(t) = y
i(t0) + yis(t2). The support comes from the determin-
istic part of the income generated before the realisation of the state.
At date t0, the expected utility maximization problem is equivalent to maxi-
mize the autarky utility in each realisation of the state, by choosing the level of
consumption cis(t) and support P
i(t0). Denote Zi(zis(t)) as the autarky value of
household i with resources zis(t) in state s:
Zi(zis(t)) = max
(Rir(t2))
S
r=1
(
ui
 
zis(t) 
1
1 + ⇢
SX
r=1
⇡srR
i
r(t2)
 
+  
SX
r=1
⇡sr
⇣
Zi
 
zir(t+ 1)
 ⌘)
.
The autarky value function is increasing, di↵erentiable and strictly concave.
Denoting autarky consumption by ecis(zis(t)), the envelope condition implies:
@Z i(zis(t))
@zis(t)
= ui0(ecis(zis(t))). (2)
3.2 Risk sharing and consumption dynamics
Now we proceed to consider the dynamic programming subject to both migration
and risk sharing. For the moment, we only consider voluntary transfers paid at
date t2. We will allow voluntary transfers paid at date t0 later.
We assume that only household i participates in migration, but household j
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does not.10 Moreover, we assume full commitment by j, but none by i.11 At date
t0, each household is aware of the previous history of shocks and the past moves
of the other household. After the state is revealed, household i makes a transfer
⌧ is(t2) S 0 to household j.
If household i deviates from the implicit risk-sharing arrangement, the entire
agreement fails and household i is left in autarky (with remittances), implemented
by specifying zero transfers in each of the subsequent periods. That is, devia-
tion from the implicit arrangement leads to an exclusion from all future mutual
insurance.
The resource constraint for each household is as follows:
cis(t) = z
i
s(t)  ⌧ is(t2) 
1
1 + ⇢
E[Rir(t2)], (3)
cjs(t) = z
j
s(t) + ⌧
i
s(t2), (4)
which imply that:
cjs(t) = zs(t) 
1
1 + ⇢
E[Rir(t2)]  cis(t), (5)
where zs(t) = zjs(t) + z
i
s(t) is the total resources available at date t in state s. The
total resources include remittances received by household i. Hence, remittances
also a↵ect the aggregated welfare of the village, and form an element of the optimal
dynamic contract.
We adopt a dynamic programming procedure and characterise the constrained
e cient outcome path. More precisely, we maximise the utility of household j for
each state at date t by choosing the level of support P i(t0), consumption cis(t), and
10The model illustrates the situation in most of the villages in developing countries, where only
a part of the households participates in migration. If we assumes that both of the households
in the model participate in migration, and there is no coordination in migration decisions, we
will have the same results. However, if the migration decisions are coordinated, and migrants
leave together, we may have a very di↵erent picture of risk sharing. As it is discussed in Munshi
(2014), by encouraging migrants to leave in groups, the sending village diversifies income sources,
and at the same time, has less e ciency lost due to limited commitment, because the migrants
can audit each other (this, however, is out of the range of the discussion in this paper).
11We posit a two-agent framework in the model. Intuitively, household j can be viewed as the
rest of the risk-sharing group. Usually, we consider the case that an individual deviates from a
group, instead of the contrary. Genicot and Ray (2003) take into account the possibility of group
deviation in the risk-sharing group formation. They found that the possibility of group deviation
leads to smaller groups and makes the risk-sharing groups less e cient. However, they did not
consider the potential di↵erences in costs involved in individual deviation and group deviation.
We think that group deviation is more costly since coordination and negotiation is more di cult
in collective decisions, and much less frequent than individual deviation in the real world. Thus,
we assume full commitment for the party representing the rest of the risk-sharing group.
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the continuation utilities U ir(t+1) for each possible state in the next period, given
the target utility U is(t) of household i and the total resources zs(t). Choosing the
support level is equivalently to choosing Rir(t2), the expected remittances received
at date t2. Plus, the consumption level of household j is determined by equation
(5).
Then the value function for household j depends on the current target utility
of household i and the current total resource. The dynamic programming problem
is written as follows:
U js
✓
U is(t); zs(t)
◆
= max
cis(t),(U
i
r(t+1))
S
r=1,(R
i
r(t2))
S
r=1
uj zs(t)  1
1 + ⇢
E[Rir(t2)]  cis(t)
!
+ 
SX
r=1
⇡srU
j
r
✓
U ir(t+ 1); zr(t+ 1)
◆
,
subject to the following constraints:
 is(t) : u
i(cis(t)) +  
SX
r=1
⇡srU
i
r(t+ 1)   U is(t), (6)
 ⇡sr 
i
r(t+ 1) : U
i
r(t+ 1)   Zi(zir(t+ 1)), 8r 2 S, 8t, (7)
⇡srw
i
r(t+ 1) : R
i
r(t2)   0, 8r 2 S, 8t. (8)
 is(t),  
i
r(t + 1), and w
i
r(t + 1) are Lagrange multipliers with respect to each
constraint.
Condition (6) is the promise keeping constraint which states that the expected
discounted utility of household i should not be lower than the target utility. Condi-
tion (7) is household i’s incentive constraint. The right hand side of the inequality
is the utility of household i in autarky excluding mutual insurance opportunities
but with remittances. Household i will not have an incentive to deviate if the
continuation utilities subject to risk sharing are not lower than the autarky utility.
The last constraint (8) is the non-negativity constraints of the remittance in each
state of the world.
We leave the derivation of the first order conditions and the process of calcu-
lation in the Appendix (A.1). Then, for all states, we have:
ui
0
(cis(t)) =  (1 + ⇢)
SX
r=1
⇡sru
i0(cir(t+ 1)) +
1 + ⇢
 is(t)
SX
r=1
⇡srw
i
r(t+ 1)
+
 (1 + ⇢)
 is(t)
SX
r=1
⇡sr 
i
r(t+ 1)(u
i0(cir(t+ 1))  ui0(ecir(zir(t+ 1)))). (9)
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Equation (9) characterises the household’s optimal inter-temporal choices. If the
incentive constraint and the non-negativity constraint are both relaxed, we obtain:
Eui0(cir(t+ 1))
ui0(cis(t))
=
1
 (1 + ⇢)
, (10)
where Eui0(cir(t + 1)) =
PS
r=1 ⇡sru
i0(cir(t + 1)). Equation (10) is the usual Euler
equation that characterises the optimal inter-temporal consumption under full risk
sharing when the ratio of marginal consumption across periods is constant and does
not depend on the realisation of the states.
Let’s look back at equation (9). The second term in the equation comes from
the non-negative constraints of remittances. It is positive as long as there exists
zero remittance in certain realisation of states. It is zero if remittances are positive
across all states and periods. The magnitude of this term depends on the number
of binding non-negativity constraints of remittances. If the number of relaxed
non-negativity constraints is high, this second term is smaller. If the number of
binding non-negativity constraints is high, in other words, if the household i is
more likely to face a zero remittance next period, this second term is large.12
The third term captures the impact of incentive constraints on the allocative
e ciency. If the incentive constraints are binding, the sign of this term depends on
the sign of ui
0
(cir(t+1)) ui0(ecir(zir(t+1))). If the agreed consumption next period
in the implicit contract is lower than the optimal autarky consumption, which is
cir(t+ 1) < ecir(zir(t+ 1)), the third term is positive, otherwise it is negative.
3.3 The change in risk sharing
The second term in equation (9) disappears if zero remittance takes place across
all states. Given a discount factor, a certain level of risk sharing can be maintained
between household i and j, but full risk sharing will not be achieved. The sign of
the third term in equation (9) depends on the di↵erence between the consumption
levels of household i in risk sharing and in pure autarky (without remittances).
If remittances are positive in certain states, however, the possibility of facing a
zero remittance is still high, the second term in equation (9) is large. At the same
time, the autarky utility of household i is increased slightly by receiving positive
remittances in some periods. It might be the case that the incentive constraints
are not a↵ected by the small amount of change in the autarky utility. The non-
negativity constraints of remittances become the relatively more important source
of ine ciency, compared to the incentive constraints. Moreover, if the third term
in equation (9) is unchanged, the importance of the second term in equation (9)
12Zero remittance may happen, for instance, in a state of nature where the migrant outside
the village faces a high probability of unemployment.
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indicates smaller consumption levels for household i. The rise in autarky value due
to migration probably is not able to compensate the loss of risk-sharing benefits.
As a result, household i would prefer to stay in the risk-sharing arrangement,
rather than return to the autarky with remittances.
However, when the possibility of receiving positive remittances is su ciently
high, the magnitude of the second term in equation (9) is small. Meanwhile, the
households face more binding incentive constraints since the autarky value is raised
significantly. For the third term in equation (9), if ui
0
(cir(t+1))   ui0(ecir(zir(t+1))),
an increase in the autarky consumption increases the absolute value of this term. If
ui
0
(cir(t+1))  ui0(ecir(zir(t+1))), an increase in the autarky consumption decreases
the absolute value of this term. Then, as a whole, the magnitude of the third term
is increased due to the rise in the autarky consumption. Contrasting the previous
case, now the third term in equation (9) that comes from incentive constraints are
the relatively more important sources of ine ciency. Household i will benefit from
a higher level of consumption if i deviates from the risk-sharing arrangement and
keeps self-insurance through migration. In other words, migration crowds out risk
sharing.
In particular, when the interest rate is high, the support-remittance contract is
more attractive, because a small amount of support can sustain a large amount of
expected remittances. This may allow household i to have a higher consumption
in each future period than that i would get in risk pooling with household j. As
a result, there must be some states of nature when household i wants to deviate
and stand alone. It would be too costly for household j to keep i staying in the
risk-sharing contract. Autarky with completely no risk-sharing may be the optimal
solution.
We summarise the above analyses in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The support-remittance contract between the migrant and the
sending household may or may not crowd out informal risk sharing in the village,
depending on the availability of positive remittances (i.e. how likely the household
faces zero remittance across states). Migration that is related to high probabilities
of zero remittance does not a↵ect the risk-sharing arrangements. However, if the
sending household tends to receive more positive remittances, the household is more
likely to deviate from the risk sharing arrangements. Then, there will be less or no
risk sharing in the village.
3.4 Ex ante transfers
In this section, we will allow voluntary transfers at date t0. This part of the
analyses is built on Gauthier et al. (1997) and Ligon et al. (1998). Gauthier et
al. (1997) showed that ex ante transfers can improve risk sharing in a dynamic
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limited commitment environment. Ligon et al. (1998) found that ex ante transfers
do not enhance mutual insurance in the presence of a storage technology, since the
e↵ect of ex ante transfers is replaced by the e↵ect of the storage. However in our
model, we will show that, if the similar “storage technology” produces uncertain
payments (remittances), introducing ex ante transfers into the dynamic contract
is beneficial.
Suppose that at date t0, household j makes an ex ant transfer ⌧(t0) to household
i. The transfer can be positive or negative. We assume that the transfer is feasible
out of the income yi(t0) or yj(t0). The ex ante transfer increases the support that
household i can provide to the migrant, and thus, increases the expected remittance
E[Rir(t2)] by E[ Rir(t2)], and we should have E[ Rir(t2)]=⌧(t0). At the same time,
the ex post transfer from j to i is reduced by E[ Rir(t2)]. Equivalently, the ex
post transfer from i to j is increased by E[ Rir(t2)].
The ex ante transfer changes the resources available to the households in au-
tarky. The incentive constraint (7) needs to be modified as follows:
U ir(t+ 1)   Zir(zir(t+ 1) + ⌧(t0)), 8r 2 S, 8t, for i, (11)
U jr (t+ 1)   Zjr (zjr(t+ 1)  ⌧(t0)), 8r 2 S, 8t, for j. (12)
In addition, household j has an incentive to make the ex ant transfer at date
t0 only if his expected utility at date t0 subject to the arrangement is higher than
the expected utility without an ex ante transfer. This is the ex ante incentive
constraint that we need to consider:
SX
r=1
⇡srU
j
r (t+ 1)  
SX
r=1
⇡srZ
j
r (z
j
r(t+ 1)), 8r 2 S. (13)
To illustrate how this strategy may improve the risk-sharing arrangement, we
consider the simplest case where there are only two states of nature r 2 S = {1, 2}.
Note that the ex ant transfer should be chosen small enough that household i’s
incentive constraint is not violated. For household j, suppose that state 1 is a
binding state given no ex transfers and state 2 is a nonbinding state.  Rir(t2) can
be larger or smaller than ⌧(t0) depending on the state. If  Rir(t2) is smaller than
⌧(t0) in state 1 and is larger than ⌧(t0) in state 2. The nonbinding constraint for
j in state 2 remains relaxed after the introduction of the ex ante transfer. This is
because the consumption on the left hand side of (12) is increased by  Ri1(t2), and
at the same time, the consumption on the right hand side of (12) is increased by
 Ri1(t2) ⌧(t0). The magnitude of the increase on the left hand side is larger than
that on the right hand side. Thus, the inequality of the nonbinding constraint still
holds.
Now we consider the change in the incentive constraint in the binding state. On
the left hand side, the consumption is increased by  Ri1(t2) after the introduction
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of the ex ant transfer. On the contrary, the consumption in autarky is decreased
since we assume that  Ri1(t2) is smaller than ⌧(t0). Hence, the investment from
household j actually relaxes some ex post binding incentive constraints while the
originally relaxed constraints are kept relaxed.
It is straightforward that the ex ante incentive constraint (13) is relaxed if the
ex post incentive constraint (12) is relaxed.
We summarise the above theoretical results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If the ex ante transfer is enforceable, risk sharing might be im-
proved in the presence of the support-remittance contract, based on the fact that ex
ante transfers increase expected remittances, and at the same time, relax some ex
post incentive constraints in implementing the risk-sharing contract.
Although remittances from migrated members provide insurance to the house-
hold, since the remittances are state contingent, it is not a guaranteed insurance.
This fact makes the household less likely to fully stand alone. Furthermore, in
the case where the ex ante transfer is allowed, the state contingency of the remit-
tances make the migration contract more flexible than a pure storage technology,
and thus, are likely to have a positive impact on risk sharing.
4 The empirical approach
4.1 Characterisation of consumption dynamics
We derive the consumption growth function using the parametric approach devel-
oped in Dubois (2001), which allows heterogenous risk preferences among house-
holds. The idea is to assume that relative risk aversion is a linear function of ob-
served characteristics. Then, with a specification of CRRA utilities, consumption
growth is derived from the Euler equation, which represents the optimal inter-
temporal consumption choices. Moreover, risk aversion parameters can be recov-
ered from the estimation and can be used to test risk reduction motives of the
choices of contracts. In the following part of this section, we will briefly introduce
the assumptions, notations and the formula of the derived consumption equation
in Dubois (2001). We leave a more detailed introduction including the instruments
sets provided by Dubois (2001) in the Appendix (A.2).13
Assume that the instantaneous utility function for household i has the following
isoelastic form:
 tuit(c) = exp(↵(x˜it))
c1 ✓(xit)
1  ✓(xit) , (14)
13For those who are interested in the econometric model and proofs, please refer to Dubois
(2001).
18
where c is consumption and   is the discount factor. x˜it and xit are vectors
of variables which are observed household characteristics. x˜it and xit contain the
same set of variables in the empirical application. Their notations are distinguished
because they will not be treated in the same manner in the econometric model.
Households are assumed to have a constant relative risk aversion equal to ✓(xit),
which depends on some characteristics xit. The multiplicative factor of marginal
utility of consumption, ↵(x˜it), also depends on some observable characteristics.
The functions ↵(.) and ✓(.) are assumed to have the following linear fomulas:
✓(Xit) = 1 +Xit✓, (15)
↵(X˜it) = X˜it↵ + ⌘it, (16)
where Xit ={...xit...} and ✓ is the aversion parameter with respect to each element
in characteristics xit. The homogeneity of relative risk aversion among agents is
obtained when ✓ = 0. ⌘it are defined as unobservable shocks. They are assumed
to be additive to factors x˜it↵ and are martingale independent across households
conditional on xit.
Measurement errors are also considered. Assume that c˜it is observed instead
of true consumption cit, and:
lnc˜it = lncit + u
c
it, (17)
where terms ucit are assumed to be independent and identically distributed across
households and periods. Moreover, they are uncorrelated with preference shocks
⌘it. From now on, the superscript c denotes error terms related to consumption.
The marginal state of substitution of consumption between periods t and t+1
depends on the availability of contingent security markets and their relative prices,
which is denoted by a random variable "it+1:
u0it+1(cit+1)
u0it(cit)
= "it+1, (18)
Intuitively, the consumption smoothing achieved by households may be perfect
or imperfect depending on the contingent markets on which they can exchange.
With full insurance markets, "it+1 = "t+1, consumption smoothing only depends
on global aggregated shocks. If the markets are complete within villages, then
we have "it+1 = "vt+1, where v denotes villages. Household consumption smooth-
ing depends on village-level aggregated shocks. In both complete market cases,
consumption smoothing does not depend on idiosyncratic shocks.
In practice, we further decompose "it+1 as follows:
ln"it+1 = e
c
vt+1 + e
c
i   ⇠cit+1, (19)
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where ecvt+1 are village-year fixed e↵ects, and e
c
i are household fixed e↵ects. ⇠
c
it+1 are
household specific idiosyncratic innovations. Assume that all kinds of idiosyncratic
innovations are correlated with household income !it+1, such that ⇠it+1 =  [!it+1 
Et!it+1]. The expected income Et!it+1 is assumed to be captured by household
characteristics, that is xit+1, as well as by unobserved eci and e
c
vt+1.
Then ln"it+1 can be rewritten as follows:
ln"it+1 = e
c
vt+1 + e
c
i    !it+1 (20)
From equation (18), parameterised by (14), (15), and(16), with error structures
(17) and (20), we obtain the consumption growth function:
 lnc˜it+1 = Xit+1✓ + x˜it+1↵ +  1!it+1 +  2!it+1 ⇤mit+1 +  ˜it+1, (21)
with Xit+1 =  xit+1 lnc˜it+1   lnc˜it xit+1, and  ˜it+1 =  it+1    !it+1 =  ⌘it+1  
ecvt+1 eci+(1+xit+1✓) ucit+1+ucit xit+1✓.   is the first di↵erence operator defined
by  Xt+1 = Xt+1  Xt.
We use mit+1 representing the migration indicator. We can test the following
hypotheses at the same time:
H1 : 1 = 0, that is full insurance for households who do not participate in migra-
tion.
H2 : 1+ 2 = 0, that is full insurance for households who participate in migration.
H3 : 2 = 0, that is households who participate in migration are the same as
households who do not participate in the level of consumption insurance.
H4 : 2 ? 0, that is the change in log consumption in response to a unit change in
income is bigger/smaller for households who participate in migration.
4.2 The income equation
The income equation has a reduced form as follows:
!it+1 =  0 +  1mit+1 +  2xit+1 +  3z
!
it+1 + e
!
vt+1 + e
!
i + u
!
it+1 + ⇠
!
it+1 (22)
We simply write household income as a function of migration choices, household
characteristics xit+1, predetermined predictors z!it+1, and the unobservables. The
predetermined variables are directly correlated with income, but only influence mi-
gration choices and consumption growth through income. The unobservables are
decomposed into village-year fixed e↵ects e!vt+1, individual household fixed e↵ects
e!i , and random shocks ⇠
!
it+1. ⇠
!
it+1 are assumed to be i.i.d. across households and
periods. u!it are classical measurement errors, and are independent from explana-
tory variables in the income equation.
The parameter that we are interested in is  1. We would like to test:
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H5 : 1 T 0 for migration indicators, that is the income gains of migration is
positive/zero/negative.
4.3 The migration decision function
Similarly, we model the migration decision as a linear function. Formally:
mit+1 = ⇢0 + ⇢1!it+1 + ⇢2xit+1 + ⇢3z
m
it+1 + e
m
vt+1 + e
m
i + u
m
it+1 + ⇠
m
it+1 (23)
where the superscript m is used to denote error terms in the migration equation.
xit+1 are observed household characteristics. zmit+1 are predetermined covariates
that are correlated with migration, but only a↵ect income and consumption growth
through migration. ⇠mit+1 are random shocks that are assumed to be i.i.d across
households and periods. umit+1 are standard measurement errors. e
m
vt+1 are village-
year fixed e↵ects and emi are household fixed e↵ects.
5 Data and the construction of variables
5.1 Data
We use a panel from the Townsend Thai Annual Resurveys (1999-2010).14 15
households in each of the 64 villages were selected following a stratified and clus-
tered random sampling process. The villages are distributed across four provinces
(changwats) of Thailand. Two of them are located in the Central region relatively
near Bangkok, and the other two are located in the poorer Northeast region. 739
households (about 62 per cent ) were continuously observed over 12 years. At-
trition was largely due to migration.15 We performed a test of attrition bias and
we did not find any significant bias in our model due to missing households (see
Appendix A.5). Thus, we will use the balanced panel in the regressions.
5.2 Endogenous variables and predetermined predictors
Our endogenous variables are income, consumption growth and migration. Sources
of revenues include agricultural production, wages, business operations, asset in-
come (including rents), pensions and other welfare transfers. Remittances from
relatives and friends are informal transfers and not counted in the calculation of
income. The net income is obtained from the gross revenue minus input costs
14The survey was initiated in 1998 following a baseline survey in 1997. We did not use obser-
vations in 1997 and 1998, because more information about migrants was only collected starting
from the 1999 survey.
15see Kaboski and Townsend (2012).
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in production and in business activities. The total consumption was the sum of
expenditures on an exclusive list of items, including expenses for food, alcohol,
tobacco, gasoline, ceremonies, vehicle repairs, education, clothing and food con-
sumed away from home.
We consider all the household members between 16 and 60 years old that are
observed in the data. In each cross section, a migrant is considered someone who
is absent from the household due to migration out of the village in that year or at a
certain point of time before. The household-level migration indicator is defined by
the absence of one or more household members as a result of migration. Di↵erent
types of migration include household head migration, child migration through jobs,
child migration through education, child migration through marriages and child
migration through other ways. We presented the details about the definitions of
migration indicators in the Appendix A.3.
We use land property rights as the predetermined factor of income. The
Townsend Thai surveys collected information about the land title of each plot
owned by a household. A land title deed in Thailand is a legal document that
specifies the owner’s rights over the land. A Chanote title deed is full ownership.
There exist other title documents that are related to temporary occupation, use
and occupation, confirmed right of possession or notification of possession of land.
In fact, all the land title documents issued by the government, except Chanote,
are still o cially government land. In our data, 35 per cent of the plots are issued
with Chanote, whilst 24 per cent of the plots do not have any land titles. For the
rest of the plots, land owners do not have full ownership but have di↵erent levels
of rights over occupation, possession, use, lease, sale etc. It is suggested in the
literature that secured land rights encourage investment in land fertility and lead
to substantially higher output (Goldstein and Udry, 2008).
Moreover, we need an instrument that is correlated with income but only a↵ects
consumption growth and migration through income. To our knowledge, there is no
direct evidence in the literature that land rights are correlated with consumption
growth. However, De la Rupelle et al. (2009) found that land-right insecurity
causes rural workers in China to migrate less, or for shorter periods. Even if a
causal correlation between land rights and the choice of migration exists, we can
still view land rights as an excluded instrument, as long as the causal correlation
is through the channel of an income e↵ect. As it is well explained in De la Rupelle
et al. (2009), land-right insecurity increases migration costs that is the income
loss caused by the loss of land. In other words, land rights only a↵ect migration
decisions through their impacts on income.
It is more tricky to construct the instrument for migration decisions. We can-
not use the proxy of the migrants’ networks as an instrument, since risk-sharing
networks are endogenous in our system. Nevertheless, we consider the group of in-
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dividual labourers that are similar in age to the average age of the migrants in the
village in each cross section. Some of those labourers in the group are migrants,
while others are not. We use the proportion of those labourers to the village
population as a predetermined factor of migration. The reasons are as follows:
Given the land areas and the population size of the village, an increase in the
number of labourers that are similar in human capital is likely to cause a decrease
in the marginal labour productivity in the village. Migration is a way to improve
labour resource allocation. Thus, we assume that any individual at the age of the
migrants is more likely to migrate if the number of similar labourers is greater
given the size of the population, provided that labourers at the same age in the
village are similar in the level of human capital.
In practice, we checked, for each individual observed in the data, the year when
he or she reached the age of the migrants. We took the value of the predictor at
that year, which is the number of labourers at the age of the migrants divided by
the population size, as the value of the instrument. If the year is not covered in our
data, we replaced the value with the predictor’s value at the earliest year that we
can observe. For those who had not reached the age, we used the contemporaneous
value of the predictor. In this way, we constructed an instrument variable for
migration, which has household-level variations across years.
In addition, household characteristics observed in the data, such as household
size, the number of children, household head education, the occupation of the
head, and total plot owned by the household, are all used as control variables in
the regressions. We also control household fixed e↵ects and village year fixed e↵ects
to control unobserved household characteristics and time-varying macro shocks.
The selection of excluded instruments for the system is crucial for the identifi-
cation of the model. In Appendix A.4, we present the results of the identification
tests. We also tested the validity and redundancy of our instruments. Our results
show that the model is identified, the excluded instruments are valid, and that
they are not redundant.
5.3 Summary statistics
Incomes and consumption are measured in Thai baht. We adjusted income and
consumption to real per capita unites (standardised by adult-male equivalents)
16 using annual household composition data and regional Consumer Price Index
16The equivalent scales come from an Indian nutritional study by Townsend (1994), which are
computed as follows: the weights depend on gender and age: 1 for male adults, 0.9 for female
adults, 0.94 and 0.83 respectively for males and females between 13 and 18, 0.67 for children
between 7 and 12, 0.52 for children between 4 and 6, 0.32 between 1 and 3 and 0.05 for babies
of less than a year.
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(base year 2011).17
Summary statistics are provided in Table (1). The mean of the per capita
consumption is 18200 bahts that is about U.S.$607.18 Average per capita income
is about U.S.$1443. Consumption takes about 42 per cent of income on average.
Per capita food consumption is about 36 per cent of the total consumption. Less
than half of the average income comes from farm profit. Plots owned per household
is 12.16 rai, which is equivalent to 1.95 hectares. Only one-third of the plots owned
are entitled with full property rights. On average, the household head is 56 years
old with an education less than five years. Half of the household heads are farmers.
Average household size is 4.35.
Summary statistics about migration are presented in Table (2) and (3). The
average age of individual migrants is 29. About 43 per cent of them are female.
Almost half of them went to Bangkok. Households participating in migration make
up 53 per cent of the total household-year observations across the 12 years. 9.6
per cent migration is household head or the head’s spouse migration. Throughout
the paper, we use head migration representing the household head migration or
the head’s spouse migration for simplicity. Eighty-seven per cent are related to the
migrating of the households’ second or third generation. Less than three per cent
are related to the migration of other family members, such as the head’s siblings,
parents of the head, and other relatives. Almost half of the migration cases are
realised through employment at destinations; four per cent are for the purpose of
marriages; and eight per cent are for education opportunities. Migrating for family
visits, conscriptions, ordainments etc. are summed up in other approaches.
6 Estimation results
Equation (21), (22), and (23) constitute the system of simultaneously determined
equations. We jointly estimate the equations using Three-stage Least Square meth-
ods, allowing arbitrary forms of correlations among these equations. Estimation
results are presented in Table (4), (5) and (6) for each equation respectively.
We first examine how migration, consumption smoothing and income are corre-
lated in general. This is reg 1 presented in the tables. In reg 2, we introduced five
more indicators which represent five di↵erent types of migration, including head
migration, child migration through jobs, education, marriages, and other ways.
We introduced more control variables in reg 3 in order to check the stability of the
model.
17CPI data are available on the website of the Bureau of Trade and Economic Indices, Ministry
of Commerce of Thai government
18In 2011, the exchange rate of baht to dollars was roughly 30 baht = U.S.$1.
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At the end of this section, we will present the estimation of risk preference
parameters and will test the correlation between the level of risk aversion and the
choices of migration.
6.1 The income equation
We start with results of the income equation (22) presented in table (4). The first
six rows in the table report the estimated  1, the parameter of interest with respect
to the contribution of migration to the contemporaneous household income.
We found a significant increase in per capita income due to migration ( 11).
The average per capita income for households participating in migration is 58,830
baht higher (which is approximately U.S. $ 1961 or 38 per cent of the GDP in
2011 in Thailand) than that of non-migrant households.19
The contribution of head migration ( 11 +  
2
1) to income is significant and
positive, but slightly smaller than that of child migrating through jobs ( 11 +  
3
1).
One explanation could be that young workers earn more in the jobs at destinations,
which are usually in the manufacture or construction sectors. Unsurprisingly, child
migration through education and for marriage do not have a significant impact on
per capita income.
We use the quantity of plots that households own with full property rights as
a predetermined predictor of income. We find significant and positive correlation
between the predictor and income. When we introduce the total plot area as
another control variable, the coe cient of the predictor becomes smaller but is
still significant. Intuitively, plots with full property rights are more productive
since households usually invest more in them. As a result, given the total land
owned by the household, more land with full property rights leads to a higher level
of income.
We also use lagged log consumption as a control variable. Dubois et al. (2008)
showed that lagged log consumption is a strong predictor of income. Our estimated
coe cients of lagged log consumption are positive and significant. Explanations
that could be consistent with this result have been provided in Dubois et al. (2008).
It could be due to the fact that the change in consumption is a good indicator of
the information that households have about income shocks. If the households have
superior information, and they smooth income, income and the change in lagged
consumption should be positively correlated. Alternatively, we could consider the
increase in consumption as an increase in labour investment. It could be the
nutrition e↵ects, body-build or emotional construction that leads to higher labour
quality. Thus, an increase in lagged consumption leads to a rise in labour e ciency,
19In 2011, GDP per capita in Thailand was U.S $ 5,192.12.
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which would contribute to a higher income.20
Income in the last period is a strong predictor in the income equation. One
unit increase in lagged income is correlated with ten per cent increase in income.
We also found that head education is positively correlated with per capita income.
The marginal e↵ect of the household size is negative and is increasing as the size
of the household grows. We did not find significant impact with regard to the age
of the head and the number of children under 12 years old.
6.2 The consumption equation, risk preferences and marginal
utility
Measuring the change in risk sharing
We now preceed to the estimated results of the consumption equation in Table
(5). The set of parameters of interest  , contains the coe cients of the income
variable and the variables that are the products of income and the migration
dummy variables. Statistical significance of   indicates a rejection of full risk
sharing. The magnitude of   measures the extend of deviation from full risk
sharing, since it is the change in consumption growth in response to a unit change
in one’s own income, given the village aggregate consumption.21
Our results show that full risk sharing is rejected overall ( 1 and  2). The level
of risk sharing is higher for observations with migration, since the average change
in consumption growth in response to a unit change in their own income is smaller,
compared to those without migration ( 2 +  1 <  1). In other words, households
participating in migration are better insured in the within-village insurance mar-
ket.
Head migration, child migration for jobs and child migration through other
ways do not have a significant impact on the level of risk sharing ( 3,  4 and  7),
whereas child migration for education improves risk sharing significantly. Quanti-
tatively, the change in consumption growth is  0.0015 ( 1 +  2 +  5) in response
to a unit change in income. The coe cient related to the impact of migration for
marriage is significant and negative ( 6). However, the degree of deviation from
full risk sharing is the largest for household-year observations with migration for
marriage ( 1+ 2+ 6). In other words, we did not find positive impact of migration
for marriage on risk sharing.
One may question why the change in consumption is negative for migration
related to education and marriage. A possible explanation may be related to the
20See details in Dubois et al. (2008).
21See Townsend (1994). We use village-year fixed e↵ects to capture the village aggregated
consumption in the estimation.
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fact that lagged consumption are positively correlated with income. If the house-
holds have superior information and they can predict the change in the income in
the next period, they are likely to adjust their contemporary consumption as well.
In fact, households usually are well prepared for events such as children going to
universities or a wedding. Then, it is not surprising that their consumption growth
is negatively correlated with a change in income, since they adjust consumption
according to their expectation about the income in the next period.
In order to testify the above postulation, we ran a OLS regression of lagged
consumption on the migration dummy variables controlled for household fixed
e↵ects. The coe cients are positive and significant. We also tried to use food con-
sumption and to introduce village-year fixed e↵ects. The results are quite similar.
This shows that it is likely that households adjust consumption in anticipation of
migration in the next period.
Why does child migration for education improve risk sharing? Our theoretical
results indicate that the impact of migration on risk sharing depends on whether
ex ante transfers can be imposed in implementing risk-sharing in the village. Risk-
sharing contracts are not directly observed in the data. However, we know that ex
ante payments are more likely to be enforceable if only a small amount of ex ante
transfers from one agent can support a large surplus that the agent can obtain
from the payment. On the contrary, a rise in the ex ante payment increases the
risks of defaults of those that receive the payments (Gauthier et al., 1997). If
education is worthy of investment, relatives or neighbours are like to give a small
amount of value to the child leaving for a university in the city. The small amount
of investment increases the total expected values that would be sent back by the
child in the future and, at the same time, relaxes ex post self-enforcing constraints
in risk sharing. As a result, each household in risk sharing will benefit from an
increase in the total aggregate resource and a higher level of insurance.
Parameters related to risk preference and marginal utility
✓ estimated in the consumption equation include the set of risk-aversion param-
eters. Our results show that households are more risk averse if there are fewer
people in the household, or if the land areas they own are smaller. Given the size
of the household, more children are likely to be correlated with less risk averse.
The characteristics of the head are also relevant. Households tend to be less risk
averse if the heads are older or have more years of education. If the head’s primary
occupation is farming, the households tend to be less risk averse. This probably is
related to the Thai government’s protection for rice farmers, since rice is the most
important export product for the country.
With the linear specification in the empirical model ✓(Xit) = 1 + Xit✓, we
calculated household risk aversion using the estimated ✓. Table (7) presents the
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distributions of households’ risk aversion. We did not see much di↵erences in the
distributions among the provinces in our data. A recent paper by Chiappori et al.
(2014) estimated risk preferences in Thailand. We plotted the density distribution
of our estimated risk aversion (see Figure (1)) and we found that the range of the
distribution is quite similar to that presented in Chiappori et al. (2014).
The estimated ↵ indicate the correlations between the control variables and the
marginal utility of consumption. We found that the marginal utility decreases with
household size, the number of children under 12 years old and plot areas. Older
household heads, or heads with a higher education or with a primary occupation
of farming also are correlated with smaller marginal utility of consumption.
6.3 Determinants for migration decisions
Table (6) presents the estimates of the migration equation. We found that per-
capita income is positively correlated with households’ participation in migration.
Intuitively, higher per-capita income usually indicates more resources available for
the support of migration. The lagged migration indicator is a strong predictor of
the contemporary migration decision. The coe cient of the constructed instru-
ment of migration is positive and significant. We also found that the households
are more likely to participate in migration if the heads are farmers, the more plot
areas owned the lower tendency to migrate and, the higher the education of the
head the lower tendency to migrate.
6.4 Estimated risk preferences and the choices of migra-
tion
We use the estimated risk aversion to test the insurance motives of migration. If
households become better insured through sending away migrants, we should find
that more risk-averse households are more likely to participate in migration.
The results of conditional logit regressions on migration decisions are presented
in Table (8).22 We found that the estimated relative risk aversion are significantly
correlated with child migrating for education. This result is consistent with our
previous finding that child migrating for education improves the level of risk shar-
ing for the sending households. The coe cients of the estimated risk aversion are
insignificant for the other types of migration, which indicates that the other types
of migration are less likely to be motivated by risk aversion.
22Random-e↵ect probit regressions provide similar results.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide theoretical and empirical evidence that migration can
improve informal risk sharing in Thai villages. Theoretically, we found that mi-
gration is likely to improve risk sharing when ex ante payments are enforceable in
implementing informal risk-sharing. Empirically, we found that di↵erent types of
migration vary in their impacts on household income and on consumption growth,
using the panel data from the Townsend Thai Annual Surveys (1997-2010). House-
hold head migration and child migrating for jobs are more likely to be motivated
by higher incomes instead of risk reduction. Whereas, child migrating for educa-
tion has significant and positive impact on the level of risk sharing. We did not
find a positive impact of migration through marriages on consumption smoothing,
probably due to a di↵erent marriage culture in Thailand from that in India, that
we will invest furthermore in future studies.
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A Appendix
A.1 Characterising the optimal intertemporal consump-
tion choice
In this section of the appendix, we will present in detail how we get the optimal
intertemporal condition for consumption from solving the dynamic program in
section (3.2).
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The dynamic programming problem is written as follows:
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i
r(t + 1) are Lagrange multipliers with respect to each
constraint.
The condition (24) is the promise keeping constraint which says that the ex-
pected discounted utility of household i should not be lower than the target utility.
Condition (25) is household i’s incentive constraint. The right hand side of the
inequality is the utility facing household i in autarky excluding mutual insurance
opportunities but with remittances. Household i will not have an incentive to
deviate if the continuation utilities subject to risk sharing are at least not lower
than the autarky utility. The last constraint (26) is the non-negativity constraints
of the remittance in each state of the world.
To characterise the optimal path, we first derive the first order conditions:
cis(t) : u
j0(cjs(t)) =  
i
s(t)u
i0(cis(t)), (27)
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The envelope conditions with respect to the total resources zs(y) is
@U js (· · ·)
@zs(t)
=  is(t)u
i0(cis(t)). (30)
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It is clear that the target utility U js for household j is increasing with the total
resources zs(t), but as the contracted value cis(t) given to household i increases, the
marginal benefit from an additional unit of total resources falls. That is, although
the remittances received by household i contribute to the aggregate resources,
which may benefit also household j, if the current state consumption of household
i that the household j has to commit to keep it inside the risk-sharing arrangement
is too high, his marginal benefit from the increasing total resources is still small.
In this case the informal risk-sharing contract may be still crowded out by the
migration. Hence, household j trades o↵ between the increasing benefit from the
increasing common pot and the household i’s incentives to stand alone.
The Envelope conditions forwarded by one period ahead imply
@U jr (· · ·)
@U ir(t+ 1)
=   ir(t+ 1), (31)
@U jr (· · ·)
@zr(t+ 1)
=  ir(t+ 1)u
i0(cir(t+ 1)). (32)
Equation (11) implies that
 is(t) =
uj
0
(cjs(t))
ui0(cis(t))
. (33)
Substitute (14) into (13), we obtain the evolution of the ratio between the two
households’ marginal utility of consumption,
 ir(t+ 1) =  
i
s(t) +  
i
r(t+ 1), 8r 2 S, 8t > 0. (34)
From equation (33)(34), the ratio of the marginal utilities of the two households
is kept constant across time and states unless the limited commitment incentive
constraints are binding. If the limited commitment constraint of household i is
relaxed so  ir(t + 1) = 0, the ratio of the marginal utility is constant. If the
constraints are binding, this ratio is no longer constant, and we obtain the limited
commitment solution.
Using equation (2)(27)(32) and(34), equation (28) yields
⇡sru
i0(cis(t)) =  (1 + r)⇡sru
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1 + r
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⇡srw
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i
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i0(cir(t+ 1))  ui0(ecir(zir(t+ 1)))), 8r 2 S.
(35)
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Summing equations (35) over all the states r 2 S yields
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Equation (36) characterises the household’s optimal inter-temporal choice. If the
limited commitment incentive constraint and the non-negativity constraint are
relaxed, we obtain
Eui0(cir(t+ 1))
ui0(cis(t))
=
1
 (1 + r)
, (37)
where Eui0(cir(t + 1)) =
PS
r=1 ⇡sru
i0(cir(t + 1)). Equation (37) is the usual Euler
equation which characterises the optimal inter-temporal consumption and support
choice.
A.2 The consumption growth function
We start from the equation (9) in our theoretical analyses. It characterises the
household’s optimal inter-temporal consumption choices and investment choice on
migration. Following Dubois (2001), we rewrite equation (9) as follows:
u0it+1(cit+1)
u0it(cit)
= "it+1, (38)
We do not know the real status of the constraints faced by household i. As in
Dubois (2001), we write the unobserved part of the above equation as a random
variable "it+1. The marginal state of substitution of consumption between periods
t and t + 1 depends on the availability of contingent security markets and their
relative prices. Intuitively, the consumption smoothing achieved by households
may be perfect or imperfect depending on the contingent markets on which they
can exchange. With full insurance markets, "it+1 = "t+1, consumption smooth-
ing only depends on global aggregate shocks. If the markets are complete within
villages, then we have "it+1 = "vt+1, where v denotes villages. Household con-
sumption smoothing depends on village-level aggregate shocks. In both complete
market cases, consumption smoothing achieved by households does not depend on
idiosyncratic shocks.
Assume that the instantaneous utility function for household i has the following
isoelastic form:
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 tuit(c) = exp(↵(x˜it))
c1 ✓(xit)
1  ✓(xit) , (39)
where c is consumption at time t and   is the discount factor. x˜it and xit are vectors
of variables which are observed household characteristics. x˜it and xit contain the
same set of variables in the empirical application. Their notations are distinguished
because they will not be treated in the same manner in the econometric model.
Households are assumed to have a constant relative risk aversion equal to ✓(xit),
which depends on some characteristics xit. The multiplicative factor of marginal
utility of consumption, ↵(x˜it), also depends on some observable characteristics.
The functions ↵(.) and ✓(.) are assumed to have the following linear fomulas:
✓(Xit) = 1 +Xit✓, (40)
↵(X˜it) = X˜it↵ + ⌘it, (41)
where ✓ is a vector of constant risk aversion parameters with respect to each
element in characteristics xit. The homogeneity of relative risk aversion among
agents is obtained when ✓ = 0. ⌘it are defined as unobservable shocks. They
are assumed to be additive to factors x˜it↵ and are martingale independent across
households conditional on xit.
Take equation (39), (40), and (41) into equation (38), and we get:
 lncit+1 = [ xit+1 lncit+1  lncit xit+1]✓+ x˜it+1↵+ ⌘it+1  ln"it+1, (42)
where   is the first di↵erence operator defined by  Xt+1 = Xt+1  Xt.
Measurement errors are also considered. Assume that c˜it is observed instead
of true consumption cit, and:
lnc˜it = lncit + u
c
it, (43)
where terms ucit are assumed to be independent and identically distributed across
households and periods. Moreover, they are uncorrelated with preference shocks
⌘it. From now on, the superscript c denotes error terms related to consumption.
Taking into account (43), (42) becomes:
 lnc˜it+1 = [ xit+1 lnc˜it+1   lnc˜it xit+1]✓ + x˜it+1↵ +  it+1, (44)
with  it+1 =  ⌘it+1   ln"it+1 + (1 + xit+1✓) ucit+1 + ucit xit+1✓.
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The error term  it+1 actually contains three di↵erent sources of shocks.  ⌘it+1
is the unobserved specific e↵ect, which is related to preferences. (1+xit+1✓) uit+1+
ucit xit+1✓ is the variation that comes from measurement errors. The random
terms ln"it+1 are aggregate temporary shocks, and they may or may not contain
idiosyncratic shocks in addition, depending on the hypothesis made on market
completeness. If market is complete (full insurance), consumption variation will
not respond to idiosyncratic shocks and will depend only on aggregate shocks.
It is obvious that the explanatory variables [ xit+1 lnc˜it+1   lnc˜it xit+1] are
correlated with the error terms. In particular, two sets of instrumental variables,
which are theoretically orthogonal to preference shocks and measurement errors,
are constructed in Dubois (2001). The sets of instruments are:
Instruments set 1 :  xit+1lncit 1 and xit x˜it   xit+1 2x˜it+1,
Instruments set 2 : Set 1 adds xit+1(xit+1+xit xit 1)lncit 1 and x2it+1 2x˜it+1 
x2it x˜it.
These instruments are theoretically valid under complete market hypotheses
in the sense that they are strongly correlated with the endogenous explanatory
variables [ xit+1 lnc˜it+1   lnc˜it xit+1], but are uncorrelated with error terms
 it+1, when ln"it+1 contain only time specific or village-time specific aggregate
shocks.23
The main objective of Dubois (2001) is to test the complete market hypothe-
ses. A direct way to do the test is to introduce an idiosyncratic innovation in the
regression. If the coe cient is significantly di↵erent from zero, then the full in-
surance market hypotheses are rejected. Otherwise, complete market hypotheses
are not rejected. In our paper, we want to test the complete market hypotheses.
But more importantly, we would like to quantitatively measure the di↵erence in
the level of consumption smoothing between the households that participate in
migration and those that do not.
In order to serve our research objective better, our specification on the error
structure will be slightly di↵erent from that in Dubois (2001) from now on. We
decompose ln"it+1 as follows:
ln"it+1 = e
c
vt+1 + e
c
i   ⇠cit+1, (45)
where Xit ={...xit...} and ecvt+1 are village-year fixed e↵ects, and eci are household
fixed e↵ects. ⇠cit+1 are household specific idiosyncratic innovations. Assume that
all kinds of idiosyncratic innovations are correlated with household income !it+1,
such that ⇠it+1 =  [!it+1   Et!it+1]. The expected income Et!it+1 is assumed to
23A proof of the theoretical validity of instruments is provided in Dubois (2001), we will not
replicate the proof in our paper.
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be captured by household characteristics, that is xit+1, as well as by unobserved
eci and e
c
vt+1.
Then ln"it+1 can be rewritten as follows:
ln"it+1 = e
c
vt+1 + e
c
i    !it+1 (46)
Define mit+1 as the migration indicator, which equals to 1 if household i partic-
ipates in migration at time t + 1, and 0 otherwise. Then our empirical model
representing consumption smoothing is as follows:
 lnc˜it+1 = Xit+1✓ + x˜it+1↵ +  1!it+1 +  2!it+1 ⇤mit+1 +  it+1, (47)
with Xit+1 =  xit+1 lnc˜it+1   lnc˜it xit+1, and  ˜it+1 =  it+1    !it+1 =  ⌘it+1  
ecvt+1   eci + (1 + xit+1✓) ucit+1 + ucit xit+1✓.
A.3 Variable construction
Started from 1999, household members who had left the households in the last
twelve months before the date of the interview are enumerated in the Townsend
Thai surveys, including information about why they left, and where he or she
stayed. A household is defined in the survey as a group of people who lived and
ate in the house for at least six months out of the last 12 months before the date
of the interview. Children who are studying away from home and are supported
by members of this household are also included in the household members. By
only counting the household members who left the households in the survey year,
we are likely to underreport migrants in the household. For example, if one works
in Bangkok for seven months, one is not counted as a household member since he
or she lives in the house less than six months, and as a result, is not counted as a
member who migrated.
To avoid this problem, we listed every individual who at least once was present
in a household as a household member over the 12 years in the survey. And then,
combining the records of their presence and absence in the household member
roster with the information about their movements in and out of the village, we
generated a dummy for each individual migrant. It is equal to one, if the individual
was absent from the household due to migrating for more than six months in the
survey year, or if the individual was present in the household but migrated for less
than six months in the survey year. At the household-year level, we counted all
individual migrants. Subsequently, we are able to construct a migration indicator
mit, which is equal to 1 if there is at least one stock of individual migrant in
household i at year t, otherwise it is equal to 0. By definition, the length of
migration can range from a few days to a few years that are covered in the survey
periods.
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Information available about the migrants in the data is summarised in table
(2). Only migrants from 16 to 60 years old are considered in the analyses. They
are the migrants who are able to leave the household independently and are more
likely to make economic contributions to the household. The average age of them
is 29 over all the person-year observations. Women make up around 43 per cent
of the total migration cases. Bangkok is the most popular migration destination,
which takes 47 per cent of the overall cases. About 20 per cent of the migrants
choose to stay nearby, that is with-in the home province. Another 30 per cent of
the migrants migrate out of the province.
We counted individual migration cases and generated the migration indicators
at the household-year level. Moreover, we generated indicators representing di↵er-
ent types of migration, using the information about who migrated and the purpose
of the movement. The migration indicators are formally defined as follows:
Individual migrant : a migrant is or was a household member that migrated
out of the village at a survey year. He or she was no longer counted as a
migrant in a year if the movement related to migration had stopped at the
beginning of the year.24
Migration : mit = 1 if there is one stock of individual migrant in household i at
year t; 0 otherwise.
Head migration : mit = 1 and the migrant is or was the head of the household.
Child migrating for jobs : mit = 1 and the migrant is a child or a grandchild
of the head, migrating for the purpose of working at the destination.25
Child migrating for education : mit = 1 and the migrant is a child or a grand-
child of the head, migrating for schools at the destination.
Child migrating for marriages : mit = 1 and the migrant is a child or a grand-
child of the head, migrating for marriage at the destination.
Child migrating for others : mit = 1 the migrant is a child or a grandchild of
the head, migrating for other reasons.26
24In other words, he or she returned to the village in the previous year and did not leave again
in the year.
25If the household head left with a child, we counted the case as head migration. We talk
about child migration if and only if the second or the third generation migrated. We have a
small number of overlapped observations involving children migrating for di↵erent purposes, and
thus, the types of child migrating is not exclusively defined.
26Other reasons include family visits, conscriptions, ordainments, vacations etc. Reasons un-
known due to missing or ambiguous records are also counted in other reasons.
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Summary statistics about households’ migration participation are provided in
table (3). Households that participate in migration make up 54 per cent of the
total 5326 household-year observations across the 12 years. Among the migration
households, about 10 per cent are related to the household head migration. Eighty-
seven per cent are related to child migration. Less than three per cent are related
to other family members, such as the head’s siblings and the parents of the head.
We are interested in migration related to jobs, marriage and education. Close
to half of the migration are for jobs. Five per cent are for marriage. And around
eight per cent are for education opportunities.
A.4 Identification tests
In this section we evaluated the identification status by applying various identifi-
cation tests on our model. We started with a test of the order and rank condition
for identification (see Greene (2002), page 392). The order condition states that
the number of exogenous variables excluded from one single-equation estimated
with instrumental variables must be at least as large as the number of endogenous
variables included in the equation. It is a necessary but not su cient condition
for identification. It ensures that the system of equations has at least on solution,
but it does not ensure that it has only one solution. The rank condition for identi-
fication states that the reduced-form coe cient matrix is of full column rank. The
rank condition ensures that there is exactly one solution for the structural param-
eters given the reduced-form parameters. We follow Baum et al. (2007) and use
the stata module “checkreg3” to examine the order and rank condition for each
equation in our model. Unless the rank condition is satisfied for each equation
in the system, the system is unidentified. The results showed that all our three
equations in the model are identified, and thus, the system is identified.
Further more, we checked the orthogonality conditions of our excluded instru-
ments, which are the instruments sets defined in Appendix A.2, the land property
right proxy and the constructed predetermined predictor of migration. We per-
formed the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions on the instrumental
variables. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments,
i.e. uncorrelated with the error terms in the system. The reported Hansen-Sargan
overidentification statistic following a 3sls estimation is 8.383, which failed to reject
the validity of our instruments. An alternative way to test the exogeneity of our
instruments is to calculate the C statistics after an estimation of the consumption
equation using 2sls (see Hayashi (2000), page 218-22). The reported C statistics is
0.926, which indicates a failure to reject the orthogonality of our excluded instru-
ments. In the meantime, we tested the redundancy of our instruments. Excluded
instruments are redundant if the asymptotic e ciency of the estimation is not im-
proved by using them. The LM test of redundancy of specified instruments rejects
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the null hypothesis and indicates that our instruments are not redundant.
A.5 Test attrition bias
Given that missing data in the panel are mainly due to migration (Kaboski and
Townsend, 2012), it is possible that our results are biased due to attrition. In this
section, we applied an approach developed by Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) to
test attrition bias.
Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) presented a parametric and a non-parametric
approach to test and correct selection bias, when the equation of interest contains
endogenous explanatory variables as well as unobserved heterogeneity, particu-
larly when instruments are correlated with the unobserved e↵ect. We follow the
parametric approach, which is valid under the assumption that the errors in the se-
lection equation are normally distributed. The approach includes adding a hazard
function into the primary regression function. If the estimated coe cient of the
hazard function is significantly di↵erent from zero, the hypothesis of no attrition
bias will be rejected. Otherwise, we get consistent estimates of parameters with
the hazard function in the regression. We will briefly introduce the parametric
correction procedure in the following paragraphs.
Define the selection indicator kit. kit = 1 if household i at time t continues
to be present in the survey in the next period t + 1. Otherwise, kit = 0. As
previously mentioned, the identification of our model depends on the observability
of variables in two consecutive time periods, which di↵ers from Semykina and
Wooldridge (2010). Formally, the real selection indicator in our model is actually
k˜it+1 = kit · kit+1. The variables in the model are only observable when k˜it+1 = 1.
Define a latent variable k˜⇤it and model the selection function as:
k˜⇤it+1 = Q
k
it+1 
k +  kit+1, t = 1, ..., T. (48)
The superscript k denotes that variables and parameters are in the selection func-
tion.  kit+1 are idiosyncratic errors. The selection indicator, k˜it+1, is generated
as:
k˜it+1 = 1[k˜
⇤
it+1 > 0] = 1[Q
k
it+1 
k +  kit+1 > 0], (49)
where 1[·] is the indicator function. Assume that:
 kit+1|Qkit+1 ⇠ Normal(0, 1), t = 1, ..., T, (50)
so that k˜it+1 follows a probit model.
The vector Qkit is restricted to contain only instrumental variables and the
exogenous variables in the primary function. Formally the selection function is as
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follows:
k˜it+1=1[k˜
⇤
it+1 > 0] = 1[Q
k
it+1 
k +  kit+1 > 0],
 kit+1|Qkit+1 ⇠ Normal(0, 1), t = 1, ..., T,
If  kit+1 is related to unobserved shocks in the regression equations, there will be
bias due to attrition. Assume that:
E (ln"it+1|Qkit+1, k˜it+1) = ⇢E ( kit+1|Qkit+1, k˜it+1), t = 1, ..., T. (51)
From the usual probit calculation:
E ( kit+1|Qkit+1, k˜it+1) =  (Xkit+1 k), t = 1, ..., T, (52)
where  (·) denotes the inverse Mills ratio, and  (·) =  (·) (·) , where  (·) is the
standard normal pdf, and  (·) is the standard normal cdf. For each time period, it
is easy to estimate P (k˜it+1 = 1|Xkit+1) =  (Xkit+1 k) using the probit model. Then,
we could use the estimates to obtain the Inverse Mills Ratios,  ˆit+1 ⌘  (Qkit+1 ˆk).
To test attrition bias, we estimate the consumption growth equation using the
2sls regression with  ˆit+1 as an additional control variable. Household characteris-
tics, the proxy of land proper rights, the constructed pre-determinant of migration
are used as instruments. In practice, we use the same set of instruments in the
selection function and in the primary equation. Parameters are identified because
of the nonlinearity of the inverse Mills ratio. The asymptotic variance is estimated
using panel bootstrap. This involves resampling cross-sectional units (and all time
periods for each unit sampled) and using the bootstrap sample to approximate the
distribution of the parameter vector.
Estimated results are presented in table (9). The estimated coe cient of the
inverse Mills ratio is small and insignificant. This result supports a rejection of
the existence of attrition bias.
A.6 Table and graphs
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variablesa Balanced panel
Mean Std.Dev
Real consumption adult-male equivalent 1.82 2.03
Real food consumption adult-male equivalent 0.65 0.36
Real net income adult-male equivalent 4.33 6.64
Real farm profit adult-male equivalent 0.63 2.98
Real wage income adult-male equivalent 1.34 2.61
Plot areas (rai) 12.16 18.05
Plot areas with full ownership (rai) 4.40 9.90
Age of the head 55.95 12.83
Years of education of the head 4.27 2.91
Highest education in the household (years) 8.66 3.89
The primary occupation of the head is farmer 0.51 0.50
Household size 4.35 1.82
The no. of children under 12 0.48 0.69
The no. of adults above 40 1.17 1.08
The number of male adults in the household 2.13 1.25
Households 739
Observations 8868
Note: (a) The unit of analysis is the household-year. Only continuously ob-
served households are considered. The unit for value denominated variables
are 10,000 Thai bahts. Income and consumption are adjusted to real per
capita units (standardised using adult-male equivalents) using annual house-
hold composition data and regional Consumer Price Index (base year 2011).
The unit of plot areas is rai, and 1 rai = 1600m2. Demographics are measured
in the initial survey.
Table 2: Individual migrants (16-60 years olda)
Panel mean
Age (years) 29.36
Female ( %) 42.92
Destinations ( %)
Outside this village but in this tambon (subdistrict) 4.18
Outside this tambon but in this amphoe (district) 5.10
Outside this amphoe but in this changwat (province) 10.39
In Bangkok 47.34
Other provinces 28.81
Other destinations 2.76
N
Migrants 1492
Observations 12573
Note: (a) The table reports descriptive statistics for all observed individual
migrants from 16 to 60 years old over the survey periods. The unit of analysis
is individual-year.
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Table 3: Household migration participationa
% in pooled data
Households participate in migration 53.65
Who migrated in these households
The head or his or her spouse migrated 9.60
Children or grand children of the head migrated 87.41
Other family members migrated 2.99
Migration approachesb
For jobs 48.30
For marriage 4.69
For education 8.41
Others and unknown 38.6
N
Households 623
Observations 5326
Note: (a) The unit of analysis is the household-year. Only continuously observed
households are considered. (b) Migration approaches are not exclusively defined.
There exists a small overlap between di↵erent approaches.
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Table 5: Consumption dynamics
Variablesa reg 1 reg 2 reg 3
b(se)b b(se) b(se)
Dependent variable:   ln(consumption)
 :
 1 Income 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
 2 Migration⇤income -0.004*** -0.002* -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
 3 Head migration⇤income -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
 4 Child migration through jobs⇤income -0.00028 -0.00025
(0.00057) (0.00056)
 5 Child migration through education⇤income -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
 6 Child migration through marriages⇤income -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001)
 7 Child migration through other ways⇤income -0.00007 -0.00006
(0.00066) (0.00065)
✓ : xit+1
Household size -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Head age -0.01408*** -0.01403*** -0.01376***
(0.00032) (0.00031) (0.00031)
Head education (years) -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
No. of children under 12 -0.015* -0.014 -0.013
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Plot areas (100 rai) -0.077*
(0.031)
Head occupation is farmer -0.022*
(0.009)
↵ : x˜it+1
Household size -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Head age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head education (years) -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
No. of children under 12 -0.011** -0.010** -0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Plot areas (100 rai) -0.060*
(0.024)
Continued on next page
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– continued from previous page
Variablesa reg 1 reg 2 reg 3
b(se)b b(se) b(se)
Head occupation is farmer -0.009*
(0.004)
Constant -0.00014 0.00003 0.00018
(0.00250) (0.00247) (0.00242)
Village-year fixed e↵ects yes yes yes
Household fixed e↵ects yes yes yes
IV set 127 yes yes yes
IV set 2 no no yes
N 7384 7384 7384
Note: This table presents the estimated results for the consumption equation. Results are
estimated through three-stage least square regressions, taking the system of equations as
simultaneously determined and allowing arbitrary correlations among these equations. The
unit of analysis for variables is the household-year. Only continuously observed samples are
considered in the regressions. (a) The unit for value denominated variables are 10,000 Thai
bahts. Income and consumption are adjusted to real per capita units (standardised using
adult male equivalents) using annual household composition data and regional Consumer
Price Index (base year 2011). (b) Standard deviations of the estimated coe cients are in the
parentheses. ⇤(p < 0.05), ⇤ ⇤ (p < 0.01), ⇤ ⇤ ⇤(p < 0.001).
27About the introduction of the instrument sets, please refer to Appendix (A.2)
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Table 4: The income equation
Variablesa reg 1 reg 2 reg 3
b(se)b b(se) b(se)
Dependent variable: Income
 :
 11Migration 5.883*** 7.717*** 7.650***
(0.319) (0.454) (0.452)
 21Head migration -1.318* -1.278*
(0.535) (0.533)
 31Child migration through jobs -0.799* -0.848**
(0.321) (0.320)
 41Child migration through education -0.144 -0.167
(0.463) (0.461)
 51Child migration through marriages -0.068 0.020
(0.615) (0.614)
 61Child migration through other ways -1.241*** -1.237***
(0.306) (0.305)
Plot area with full property rights (rai) 0.028** 0.032*** 0.022*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Lagged ln(consumption) 0.484*** 0.587*** 0.566***
(0.114) (0.122) (0.122)
Lagged income 0.083*** 0.102*** 0.097***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Household size -0.224*** -0.184** -0.807***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.182)
The age of the head -0.001 -0.00031 0.069
(0.009) (0.00886) (0.054)
Head education (years) 0.330*** 0.316*** 0.322***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
No. of children under 12y 0.019 0.009 0.286
(0.126) (0.129) (0.226)
Head occupation is farmer -0.110 -0.200 -0.569**
(0.155) (0.166) (0.184)
The square of household size 0.060***
(0.018)
The square of head age -0.00061
(0.00046)
The square of the no. of children under 12y -0.127
(0.092)
Plot area (100 rai) 3.106***
(0.616)
Constant 0.062 0.049 0.051
(0.129) (0.131) (0.130)
Village-year fixed e↵ects yes yes yes
Household fixed e↵ects yes yes yes
N 7384 7384 7384
Note: This table presents the estimated results for the income equation. Results are es-
timated through three-stage least square regressions, taking the system of equations as si-
multaneously determined and allowing arbitrary correlations among these equations. The
unit of analysis for variables is the household-year. Only continuously observed samples are
considered in the regressions. (a) The unit for value denominated variables are 10,000 Thai
bahts. Income and consumption are adjusted to real per capita units (standardised using
adult male equivalents) using annual household compostion data and regional Consumer
Price Index (base year 2011). (b) Standard deviations of the estimated coe cients are in
the parentheses. ⇤(p < 0.05), ⇤ ⇤ (p < 0.01), ⇤ ⇤ ⇤(p < 0.001).
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Table 6: Migration choices
Variablesa reg 1 reg 2 reg 3
b(se)b b(se) b(se)
Dependent variable: migration
Income 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Migration in the last period 0.540*** 0.548*** 0.548***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Predetermined predictor of migration 0.975** 1.005** 0.999**
(0.350) (0.360) (0.360)
Household size -0.002 -0.005* -0.009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Head education (years) -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
No. of children under 12y 0.001 0.002 -0.012
(0.006) (0.005) (0.010)
The square of household size 0.00044
(0.00071)
The head occupation is farmer 0.028***
(0.008)
Plot area (100 rai) -0.094***
(0.025)
Constant 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Village-year fixed e↵ects yes yes yes
Household fixed e↵ects yes yes yes
N 7384 7384 7384
Note: This table presents the estimated results for the equation of the migration
decision, with the general migration indicator as the dependent variable. Results
are estimated through three-stage least square regressions, taking the system of
equations as simultaneously determined and allowing arbitrary correlations among
these equations. The unit of analysis for variables is the household-year. Only
continuously observed samples are considered in the regressions. (a) The unit
for value denominated variables are 10,000 Thai bahts. Income and consumption
are adjusted to real per capita units (standardised using adult male equivalents)
using annual household size data and regional Consumer Price Index (base year
2011). (b) Standard deviations of the estimated coe cients are in the parentheses.
⇤(p < 0.05), ⇤ ⇤ (p < 0.01), ⇤ ⇤ ⇤(p < 0.001).
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Table 7: Distribution of estimated relative risk aversion
Percentiles
Province id min 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th max Std.Dev N
07 -0.57 -0.23 -0.11 0.02 0.15 0.24 0.43 0.18 2340
27 -0.61 -0.18 -0.06 0.06 0.16 0.22 0.42 0.16 2220
49 -0.52 -0.21 -0.13 -0.01 0.14 0.22 0.40 0.17 1992
53 -0.65 -0.23 -0.14 0.00 0.13 0.21 0.49 0.17 2314
Total -0.65 -0.22 -0.11 0.02 0.14 0.22 0.49 0.17 8866
Note: The table reports summary statistics from the distribution of estimates of household’s risk
aversion ✓(zit). The risk aversion estimates are calculated by ✓ˆ(Xit) = 1 +Xit✓ˆ, and ✓ˆ are estimated
coe cients from reg 2 in the consumption equation. The unit of analysis is household-year. Only
continuously observed samples are considered.
Table 8: Relative risk aversion and the choice of migration
Migration Head children⇤job children⇤education children⇤marriages Children⇤others
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Dependent variable: the migration indicatorsa
Estimated relative risk aversionb 9.527 10.408 11.345 62.660*** -26.589 2.374
(6.860) (12.960) (6.911) (14.730) (23.119) (6.964)
Household size -0.703*** -0.277 0.181 1.470*** -1.011 -0.197
(0.176) (0.322) (0.176) (0.365) (0.590) (0.177)
Head education 0.210 0.065 0.419* 1.427*** -0.416 0.194
(0.162) (0.307) (0.169) (0.340) (0.550) (0.165)
Head age 0.108 0.156 0.212* 0.904*** -0.358 0.034
(0.097) (0.180) (0.097) (0.209) (0.326) (0.098)
The head occupation is farmer 0.031 0.193 0.170 0.085 -0.483 0.119
(0.141) (0.279) (0.140) (0.250) (0.514) (0.134)
Household fixed e↵ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 3408 804 2532 1032 360 2520
Note: This table presents the results of conditional logit estimation. The unit of analysis is household-year. Only continuously observed samples are
considered in the regressions. (a) The dependent variables from the left to the right are respectively: the indicator for head migration, child migrating for
jobs, for education, for marriage and for others. (b) The estimated risk aversion are obtained by ✓ˆ(zit) = 1+zit✓ˆ. ✓ˆ are part of the estimated coe cients in
the consumption equation (reg2). (c) Standard deviations of the estimated coe cients are in the parentheses. ⇤(p < 0.05), ⇤⇤ (p < 0.01), ⇤⇤⇤(p < 0.001).
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Table 9: Test attrition bias
2sls
b/se
Dependent variable:   ln(consumption)
 :
Income 0.011
(0.006)
Migration⇤income -0.025*
(0.012)
✓ : xit+1
Household size -0.035***
(0.002)
Head age -0.012***
(0.000)
Head education (years) -0.031***
(0.002)
No. of children under 12 -0.002
(0.006)
↵ : x˜it+1
Household size -0.041***
(0.011)
Head age -0.003***
(0.001)
Head education (years) -0.035***
(0.005)
No. of children under 12 -0.004
(0.006)
Inverse Mills ratio -0.049
(0.027)
Constant -0.001
(0.003)
Village-year fixed e↵ects yes
Household fixed e↵ects yes
N 6871
Note: This table presents the estimated results
for the consumption equation with a test of
attrition bias. Results are estimated through
two-stage least square regressions. Income
and the products of income and the migra-
tion dummies are instrumented with house-
hold characteristics, land property rights and
the constructed predeterminate predictor of
migration. (a) The unit for value denominated
variables are 10,000 Thai bahts. Income and
consumption are adjusted to real per capita
units (standardised using adult male equiv-
alents) using annual household composition
data and regional Consumer Price Index (base
year 2011). (b) Standard deviations of the
estimated coe cients are estimated through
bootstrap with 50 replications and are pre-
sented in the parentheses. ⇤(p < 0.05), ⇤⇤(p <
0.01), ⇤ ⇤ ⇤(p < 0.001).
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